Historical Context and Philosophy of Science: Reply to Peter Simons' 'Coincidence and Kite-Flying' by Sterrett, Susan
 
Historical Context and Philosophy of Science:  
Reply to Peter Simons' "Coincidence and Kite Flying"  
 
    In his review of my book1, Wittgenstein Flies A Kite:  A Story of Models of Wings and 
Models of the World, Peter Simons implies that I take a coincidence as my starting point 
and, from it, attempt to infer a connection (between the methodology of scale models 
and the view of propositions in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.)  That's not how I present 
things.  Rather:   Wittgenstein made a connection between scale models and 
propositions.  I provide the historical context to explain what the term "scale model"  
meant to someone situated as he was, and, more importantly, explain the development 
of the accompanying notion of similarity in that historical context.   Simons tries to argue 
against historical context being very important, but his argument relies upon mistaken 
ideas about how isolated Wittgenstein was throughout 1914.  It is unfortunate that 
Simons acts as though identifying a causal path were the main issue, and misstates or 
neglects so much of the book that should be of interest to philosophers of science. 
      The important notion in the historical context is that of physically similar systems.  It 
is a generalization of the notion of geometrically similar figures.   It generalizes the notion 
of similarity found in the discipline of geometry to various notions of similarity in physics 
(kinematic similarity, dynamic similarity, hydrodynamic similarity, electrical similarity, 
usw.).   The notion was quite consciously revived from the Renaissance (specifically 
from some lesser-known writings of Newton and Galileo) in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  Around 1911 - 1914, the topic of similarity took on heightened 
prominence in a variety of scientific fields.   Thus I wrote in the preface (p. vii): "This 
book traces threads in the background of the first private moment" of an insight that 
Wittgenstein reported having.    
     In this reply, I'd like to correct the misconception Simons' review gives (that my book 
is about a coincidence of two isolated moments widely separated in space), along with 
some other misconceptions in his review.  I also want to identify and correct the errors of 
historical fact he makes and relies upon to argue against the significance of the historical 
context.  Finally, I point out a few things in my book that he omits to mention that tell 
against some of the other things he says in his review of my book.   
                                            
1  Simons, Peter . "Coincidence and Kite Flying"  Metascience, March 2009.  
     Let's get the historical facts straight first.  Simons is confused about where 
Wittgenstein was when.  My approach appealed more to what was available in the 
scientific milieu than to any specific interaction, but since Simons relies on where he 
(mistakenly) thinks Wittgenstein was at various times in 1914 in order to discredit my 
suggestion that Wittgenstein could have been cognizant of  discussions in Vienna about 
what was going on in science at the time, these errors of factual detail matter to 
defending my more general claims.   Simons states: "Ludwig Wittgenstein, thinking hard 
in his Norwegian fastness about how propositions represent the world and how logic 
works, recalled reading about the use of a small model of streets and cars used in a 
Paris court to represent a traffic accident, and hit upon the idea of a proposition."   Now, 
Simons is just plain wrong about Wittgenstein being in Norway when this happened;  per 
the oft-quoted excerpt from von Wright's widely available memoir:    
 
"There is a story of how the idea of language as a picture of reality occurred to 
Wittgenstein.  [There exist several somewhat different versions of it.]  It was in the 
autumn of 1914, on the eastern front.  Wittgenstein was reading in a magazine 
about a lawsuit concerning an automobile accident. " 2 
 
Every scholarly biographical work I know of places the event after Wittgenstein entered 
the military, in the Fall of 1914; I don't think there is any dispute about this.  Simons goes 
on to say, mistakenly, that in 1914 "Wittgenstein had long given up aviation in favour of 
logic and was geographically and culturally isolated in Norway (the outbreak of the war 
took him by surprise.)"   First of all, the issue is not whether he had given up aviation, as 
we are talking about physics here, and one of the premier physics journals at that; 
Wittgenstein later mentions the very physics journal (The Physical Review) that 
published the proof Simons is referring to, in a letter to his student W. H. Watson.3  
Putting that aside:  Simons is mistaken here, too, on the facts of Wittgenstein's 
whereabouts.  Actually, Wittgenstein was not isolated in Norway up until the war began: 
he spent July 1914 in Vienna, and did not enter military service until early August.  This 
                                            
2 Von Wright, G. H.  (n.d.)  Wittgenstein.  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  p. 21 
3 Wittgenstein in Cambridge:  Letters and Documents 1911 - 1951.  Edited by Brian McGuinness.  
Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.  Revised edition, 2008.  Letter number 163 from Wittgenstein to 
W. H. Watson. 
is clear from many biographies -- and is definitively established by a letter he wrote from 
Vienna on July 3rd, 1914.4  (By the way, it just so happens that July 1914 was the month 
that the National Academy of the Sciences issued the brief communication "On 
Physically Similar Systems" by Edgar Buckingham, a sort of synopsis of the main 
theoretical points in his forthcoming paper of the same name.)   
     There was another break in Wittgenstein's seclusion in Norway -- Christmas of 1913, 
which he spent in Vienna at the wishes of his mother.  Again, that he was in Vienna then 
is definitively indicated by a letter he wrote to Russell from Vienna dated Christmas 
1913.5  (By the way, it just so happens that December 1913 was when Heike 
Kammerlingh Onnes gave his Nobel acceptance lecture on the use of mechanical 
similarity in conjunction with the kinetic theory of gases.  I discuss the significance of 
Onnes' lecture in my book, especially in Chapters 6 and 7 ). 
 
      Now, about the significance of the year 1914.  The year 1914 was a decisive one in 
the history of similarity, in which the insights that Galileo and Newton had about how to 
generalize the notion of similarity from geometry to mechanics was finally made fully 
general, and given a formal basis. This was done by Edgar Buckingham, a 
philosophically minded physicist drafted to serve on the US Advisory Committee on 
Aeronautics, but he laid no claim to developing it, only to articulating it clearly and laying 
out its foundations. He did this because the state of flight research at the time lacked 
such a reference articulating the theoretical foundations of the method in use.  As I 
explain in my book, there was a gradual progression from specific notions of similarity to 
more general accounts of similar motions in hydrodynamics, to the more mathematical, 
and finally, logical accounts of it in the early twentieth century.   Galileo had referred to 
geometry when he spoke of the book of nature being written in the language of 
mathematics;  Buckingham's more general account of similarity and invariants gives this 
place to any symbolic system having certain features, and formalizes similarity in such a 
way that the important consequences about similarity follow from a principle of logic.  Of 
course his account of the foundations bore some marks of his own academic training in 
Europe under Ostwald, and reflected his philosophical inclinations.       
                                            
4  Ibid.  Letter number 43 from Wittgenstein to G. E. Moore is dated July 3rd, 1914, and 
written from the family home on what was then the outskirts of Vienna.   
5   Ibid.,  Letter number 33. 
     However, I do not, as Simons implies I do, point to a single person and a single 
theorem in isolation from the intellectual currents of the time.  What I give is an account 
of some currents in the intellectual and scientific milieu, one of which is the attention 
directed to the urgent problem of the credibility of the use of experimental models 
(people knew how to build and use experimental models; what they lacked was a 
account of the validity of what they were doing that would satisfy physicists and 
mathematicians.)  It is the culmination of centuries of work on similarity from Galileo 
onwards, including Newton, Helmholtz, Fourier, Froude, Reynolds, and Rayleigh, to 
mention only a few.  I discuss a great number of discussions about this problem at the 
time by others (e.g., Stanton and Pannell's work, Gibson's text, James Thompson's 
anthology of papers on similarity published in 1913).  I discuss other work related to 
similarity, too, besides the efforts to justify inferences from experimental models in wind 
tunnels.  There is D'Arcy Thompson's work, which later led to his On Growth and Form, 
a book containing one full chapter devoted to dimensional analysis.  Much of the 
literature he cites about scale in biology in that chapter is work that was done in the 
service of solving problems about flight.   
      Among the many other things I discuss is the explicit mention in physics venues of 
Galileo's Two New Sciences.  The work is known for its discussion of the problem of how 
one can make inferences about a large machine from the behavior of a small machine.  
There was a publishing project underway then to remedy the fact that no translation of it 
was then readily available.  I discuss Heike Kammerlingh Onnes' crediting of Isaac 
Newton for the inspiration to apply  mechanical similarity to the molecular motion of 
gases.  I presented these as part of the milieu in which Wittgenstein was thinking about 
logic, but it turned out a more concrete connection existed, too:  it has recently been 
discovered that some of the books in Russell's library originally belonged to 
Wittgenstein. (Hide  2004) One of these was a copy of Galileo's Two New Sciences 
purchased before the new translation was available:  at the time Wittgenstein purchased 
it, it was rare and very expensive and a somewhat unusual purchase; he owned no other 
works by Galileo.   Another of these books was the very work of Newton's in which he 
discusses his use of mechanical similarity.  I discuss this in my book, so I think it unfair 
of Simons to begin his review with the statement:  "This book is about a coincidence", 
then mention only a proof by Buckingham.   
     Simons also misleads by implying that I mention the paper by Buckingham mainly for 
a proof it contains.  He misstates the significance of the paper by implying that it is just 
about a proof, then misstates the gist of the proof as one about reducing the number of 
variables in an equation of the sort used in physics.  He neglects the whole point that 
Buckingham's 1914 papers on physically similar systems are about how to establish that 
two physical systems are physically similar.  There are two kinds of equations under 
discussion, and Simons runs them together:  (i) physical equations, such as occur in 
science, and (ii) dimensional equations, which are of a different sort logically speaking.  
There are likewise two distinct points that Simons runs together:  one is that a physical 
equation (the kind of equation used in physics) can be rewritten as an undetermined 
function of dimensionless parameters.   The other is that, once the dimensional 
equations are used to determine a set of dimensionless parameters that characterize the 
behavior of a system, the system behavior is determined by a certain minimal number of 
dimensionless parameters, even if the experimenter cannot predict or describe the 
system's behavior in terms of them.  The proof is about determining that minimal 
number.  
      Simons seems not to realize that dimensional equations are of a different sort than 
physical equations, and takes the advance in Buckingham's "On Physically Similar 
Systems:  Illustrations of the Use of Dimensional Equations" to be a small technical 
matter of reducing the number of variables in an equation.  Perhaps it is no wonder, 
then, that Simons doesn't think there is much of logical significance here.  It seems to 
me that Simons, in missing the difference between physical equations and dimensional 
equations, misses the role of dimensionless parameters, too.  It is equality of 
dimensionless parameters that establishes similarity of physical systems.  Here I see an 
analogy with the role of facts on the account in the Tractatus.  To avoid reproducing the 
bulk of the last chapters of the book here, I simply refer the reader to the book.    
     To Simons' complaint that the analogy I draw looks only superficial so far as he can 
tell, I can only say that one can lead a person to a pattern, but cannot make him or her 
see what one sees in it.  I can only suggest studying the analogy I have laid out, while 
well aware of the tedium this involves until the analogy is grasped.   Here it seems to me 
that the aforementioned failure to distinguish between physical equations and 
dimensional equations is an obstacle for Simons.  He writes:  "the kind of independence 
that Wittgenstein envisaged holding between propositions was wholly different from the 
independence of variables in a physical equation.  One is logical, the other functional, 
independence."   Actually, on page 239 of the book I point out that independence of 
dimensionless parameters is established as a matter of logic.  This is in part why 
Buckingham said that so much that had earlier been thought to be an empirical matter 
actually followed from a principle of logic.  I don't blame Simons for a little disbelief here;  
it shows he understands something of the significance of what  I claim follows from the 
analogy.  The first reaction of anyone who really understands what is being claimed or 
revealed by Buckingham's formulation is disbelief that certain things could possibly be a 
matter of logic alone.  As someone has put it, at first dimensional analysis seems like 
magic.   In more recent work, I have delved deeper into where this information comes 
from;  it has to do with the empirical content already built into the relationship between 
systems of units suitable for use in a physical science and systems of scientific laws. 
(Sterrett 2006, Sterrett 2009)   As for Simons' complaint that Wittgenstein's  recursive 
application of a general truth-functional operator is very different from equations 
involving  "products of powers of quantities" , as he puts it, Simons neglects to mention 
what I do say about operations:  that dimensions on Buckingham's account are regarded 
as the results of operations and that the exponent indicates that the operation has been 
recursively applied.  In fact, I point out that what numbers turn out to be are exponents of 
operations, on both the exposition Buckingham gives of dimensional equations, and on 
the account Wittgenstein gives in the Tractatus.  (p. 192)   Here again I must refer the 
reader to my book, to avoid reproducing lengthy portions of it here.   I thank Simons for 
paying so much attention to the details of the analogy presented in the book, though.  
These are exactly the crucial points to look at.  I suspect few readers have accorded the 
analogy such scrutiny.  I expect that a better understanding of the logic of dimensions 
and dimensional equations might clear things up and, hopefully, reward such headache-
inducing efforts.     
     I have two other criticisms of Simons' review that are matters of omission.  The first Is 
that he neglects to mention that all of Wittgenstein's journals, notes, and papers prior to 
1914 were destroyed (at his request).  Thus it is not good reasoning on Simons' part to 
take lack of evidence of this sort as evidence of lack of any particular interest.   As for 
actual documents from this period of Wittgenstein's life, there is little more than the 
letters he wrote that others have kept.  I did not  think that I did anything to raise 
expectations that I would establish a specific causal connection, as Simons implies I do -
-- just the opposite:  from the beginning, on pg. xx in the Preface, I clearly state that any 
direct evidence in the form of his journals, papers he read was unavailable.  (The books 
recently found in Russell's library are from that period and, as mentioned above, bear out 
my suggestion of an interest in physical similarity.)  I thought that I made it clear that 
there was no other choice than to proceed as I have done, by triangulation from other 
currents in his milieu and from what he wrote that was not destroyed (e.g., my remarks 
on p. 205).   
     My other complaint about omissions in Simons' review is that he neglects to mention 
the new critical-historical contributions in the book about Wittgenstein's childhood that I 
dug up:  the discussion of phonautographs (sound records never meant to be played 
back, but only to be viewed) that were standard fare in children's science textbooks of 
the era, and the prominent role that the problem of scaling played in one of the most 
popular boys' novels of the time:  H. G. Wells' Robur the Conqueror.  The first is 
discussed at length in the first chapter and is the subject of a self-standing philosophical 
paper (Sterrett 2005a); the latter connects directly with a popular lecture on aeronautics 
that Boltzmann gave in Vienna practically around the corner from Wittgenstein's home 
when he was six years old.   Why Simons does not even mention these, but brings up jet 
engines (which are from a later era and are not mentioned in my book) is a little puzzling.  
The threads from the milieu in Wittgenstein's very early life that I lay out in the beginning 
of the book are picked up near the end of the book and woven into the account I give.  
     Simons uses the metaphor of kite-flying to have a little fun at my expense in the 
closing of his review.  I would reply in a light-hearted vein:   History indicates one ought 
never be too hasty in saying whether something can fly or not -- especially on the basis 
of pure thought.  I appreciate that Simons has at least tried to grasp the analogy the 
book presents, and have some sympathy with his frustration. It is not a simple analogy.  
That he has honed in on some of its crucial claims attests to the work invested in trying 
to understand the analogy.   
     Perhaps the more technical philosophical points in my book are more suited to an 
audience of philosophers of science than to people of the current generation who work 
on Wittgenstein (few of whom have a strong background in pure science).   Philosophers 
of science might gain from it something else that others might not:  an awareness of the 
genesis of ideas that made their way into the philosophy of science of the latter half of 
the twentieth century, long after the umbilical cord to the Vienna Circle had dissolved 
and direct influences from that era had waned.  On some other occasion, I shall trace the 
unfortunate story of the fate of the notion of scale model in philosophy of science.  But 
that is another story.  As for this one, the book's original title was  "A World Put Together 
Experimentally."   It was intended to have something of interest in it for just about 
everyone, not least of all for philosophers of science.  I hope philosophers of science will 
not be put off reading it by the title I ended up using --- nor by any of the erroneous 
claims in Simons' review.   
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